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I. Introduction
State Regulation of Federal
Dredging Projects:
Sovereign Immunity and the
Issue of Reasonable Fees
by John Michael Chamberlain
Managing California's seaports and large waterways
requires sensitivity to both economic and environmental
concerns. Most, if not all. of the state's harbors, bays, ports,
and navigable rivers must be periodically dredged and/or
filled in order to facilitate the enormous range of economic
interests that depend on functional, water-based access to
the State.' In frequent conflict with the State's economic
interests is the need for environmental protection and
preservation. California's aquatic resources, including the
economically significant waterways mentioned above, are
among the State's most precious environmental assets. Not
only are navigable waters important tools of commerce, but
they play a significant role in defining the ecological charac-
ter of the State. Unfortunately, dredge and fill operations
have deleterious effects on the water quality and organic
habitat of the areas in which they are performed.2
California's State Water Resources Control Board
("SWRCB")3 is the state agency which oversees the regulato-
I.D. Candidate, Spring 1996, University of California Hastings College
of the Law. BA with Honors, University of California at San Diego. 1992.
Thanks to Caryn Craig and the entire West-Northvwest Staff.
i. with regard to the San Francisco Bay alone. it Is estimated that 4000
commercial vessels move through the estuary on an annual basis, trans-
porting more than 50 million tons of cargo worth 25 billion dollars. lane Ka-y".
PNton Lurks In Bay Sludge. S E: A%,v,. O 28, 1993. at A12. The depth of a
navigable watervay is directly proportional to the amount of cargo that is
able to be shipped through that passage. For example, a ship transporting
$7.2 million of wheat could potentially carry S8 million of wheat given only
an additional three feet of draft. Draft is the distance between the keel of the
vessel and the water line. 'Every foot of extra draft for a container vessel
allows shippers to add an average of Si million in goods such as lumber.
grain or processed food." Anita Marks. Port Deens CFannd Dredging CrucaTo
FMaw cf Cc:.s. Bun:iEss loumALz. - PoRtru.;o. vol 11. No. 27. Sept 2. 1994. at 1.
2. The environmental risks of dredging include- 1) Harm to benthic
organisms resulting from the acute chemical and mechanical effects of
increased turbidity, oxygen demand, and sedimentation. 2) Increased bio-
logical exposure to formerly bound or buried pollutants and toxicants, par-
ticularly when dredging occurs in harbors or channels where elevated levels
of toxic materials are more likely to exist, and 3) Reduction in water visibil-
ityand fish catch in some areas (such as the Central San Francisco Bay). CA.
CoDE RES. tit. 23. § 2906 (1995) (State Water Resources Control Board
"Pollutant Policy Document).
Dredging thus may harm. . finfish, shellfish and other bottom-
dwelling organisms by reintroducing prLviously unavailable tox-
cants into the food chain. Dredging may not only harm fish and
wildlife but also recreational uses such as hunting and fishing
when habitat is degraded by the introduction of dredged matenals
resulting in turbid waters, and when areas are dosed or health
warnings have to be Issued by DHS. Commerce and navigation
uses which depend on dredging must be balanced against the dam-
age by dredging to other beneficial uses.
Id.
3. The California State Water Resources Control Board Is responsible
for administering the Porter-Cologne water Ouality Control Act. Cal. Water
Code § 13000 et seq,. as vell as Division 2 of the Water Code (with respect
to allocation of surface water rights). The SWRCB is situated within the
California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal-EPA), and is subdivided
Into nine regional water quality control boards. The SWRCB has the power
of review and discretionary approval over most regional board actions. See
Patrick T. Cooney. 'IaterRisures Cnircl & ad. 14 CAL. REc. L RE. 173. 173
(SprdnESummer 1994).
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ry activities of nine California regional water quality
control boards.4 Part of the SWRCB's function is to
formulate and adopt state policy concerning dredg-
ing', which is then implemented by the regional
water boards. With respect to dredging, the SWRCB
is caught between conflicting loyalties. The
SWRCB's dredge/fill policies must strike a precari-
ous balance between environmental protectionism
and facilitation of the State's economic welfare.
Complicating the formula is the fact that the
SWRCB cannot rely wholly on legislative funding to
subsidize its regulatory programs. 6 Instead, the
SWRCB must assess regulatory fees in exchange for
its various services, permits, and licenses. 7 Such
fees have become an increasingly vital source of
funding for the SWRCB. 8 Without payment of water
quality fees by those who discharge into state
waters, the SWRCB would be severely restricted in
its ability to monitor and regulate water pollution.
By extension, an inability to collect fees from major
dischargers would frustrate the free exercise of state
police powers in the areas of the environment,
internal economics, and public health and safety.
Under the Porter-Cologne Water Ouality
Control Act,9 the SWRCB regulates waste discharge
into the State's waters by prescribing waste dis-
charge requirement orders. In accord with the sov-
ereign prerogative of states to police their internal
interests, the California Legislature has enacted two
statutes to collect fees for dredge or fill operations:
California Water Code sections 13260 and 13396.5.10
These two provisions create the Waste Discharge
4. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 3857 (1993) (describing
the process by which the regional boards review and impose
requirements on activities that may result in discharge into the
navigable waters of the United States).
5. CAL. WATER CODE § 13140 (West 1992).
6. STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, ALTERNATIVE
FUNDING CONCEPTS FOR WATER AND WATER RIGHTS PROGRAMS IN
CALIFORNIA 6-14 (1992).
7. Those SWRCB activities partially funded by fees include:
.prescribing, reviewing, and updating waste discharge require-
ment orders and permits; conducting compliance inspections;
analyzing ambient water quality and discharger self-monitoring
data and reports; responding to complaints and noncompliance;
and taking enforcement actions." Memorandum from Donald
Owen, State Water Resources Control Board, to I. Michael
Chamberlain (July 7, 1995) (on file with author). See also CAL. WATER
CODE §§ 13162 ('Research Program"), 13163 ("Coordination and
evaluation of investigations; recommendations"), 13165
("Inspection and report by state or local agencies on technical
factors; costs"), 13166 ('Data storage and retneval program"),
13170.5 ("Environmental management"), 13267 ("Investigation of
water quality; reports; inspection of facilities"), 13383
('Monitoring, inspection, entry, reporting, and recordkeeping
requirements; establishment and maintenance; inspections')
(West 1992, West Supp. 1995).
8. See infra note 10.
9. CAL. WATER CODE § 13000 et seq. (Division 7 of the
Requirement ("WDR") fee program and the Bay
Protection and Toxic Cleanup Plan ("BPTCP"),
respectively. Both fee programs were created to
help fund state regulatory efforts to monitor and
respond to water quality fluctuations, as well as
perform more generalized water resource manage-
ment. In addition, the regulations designed to
implement the WDR program and the BPTCP
include separate fee assessment scales specifically
calibrated for application to dredge/fill opera-
tions."
The Federal Government also plays a central role
in the continued dredging and filling of California
waterways.' 2 The United States Army Corps of
Engineers has authority under the Clean Water Act
("CWA") 13 to approve dredge/fill projects and Issue
certifications to that end. 4 In addition, the Corps
does much of the major dredging itself. This Note
argues that federal entities, such as the Army Corps
of Engineers, which undertake dredge/fill activities
in California are obligated to comply fully with both
the WDR program and the BPTCP In doing so, fed-
eral entities must pay all state fees owed under
those programs. If federal dredging projects fall to
pay WDR and BPTCP fees, the State will be unfairly
handicapped in its efforts to discharge its tradition-
al, sovereign regulatory functions over dredge and
fill activities.
A threshold issue involved in the federal pay-
ment of state water quality fees is the notion of fed-
eral sovereign immunity. It is a well-settled consti-
tutional principle that federal activities enjoy a
California water Code).
I0. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13260, 13396.5 (West Supp. 1995).
Note that neither statute is specific to dredge/fill operations, In
fiscal year 1993-94, Water Code Section 13260 fees represented
approximately one third of the total funding necessary for the
SWRCB "Core Regulatory Program." Memorandum from Donald
Owen, State Water Resources Control Board, to J, Michael
Chamberlain (July 5, 1995) (on file with author).
iI. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, §§ 2200(a)(1), 2236(c)(6) (1994).
12. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which Is responsible
for managing the technical and logistical elements of dredging In
California, maintains both San Francisco and Los Angeles district
headquarters. Combined, the two districts manage between three
and five million cubic yards of dredged material annually,
Testimony June 14, 1994 Joseph D. Germano West Coast Dredging House
Merchant ManneslOceanography, Gulf of Mexico, and the Outer
Continental Shelf Regional Dredging Issues, Federal Document Clearing
House Congressional Testimony (June 14, 1994).
13. Officially titled the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).
14. Clean Water Act § 401. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1986)
("Certification") and Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C § 1344
(Supp. 1994) ('Permits for dredged or fill material"), Note that
under CWA § 404, a federal dredging certification carries with it
concurrent authority by the State to either Issue or waive WDR
fees.
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blanket immunity from payments demanded pur-
suant to state regulation and taxation. 15 However, it
is also well-established that Congress can waive
such implied sovereign immunity by a "clear and
unambiguous" mandate to that end.16 Part I1 of this
Note contends that "clear and unambiguous"
waivers of federal sovereign immunity from pay-
ment of WDR and BPTCP fees pursuant to
dredge/fill activities exist in two different locations
in the federal CWA sections 313(a) and 404(t).i7
Specifically, Part II suggests that the state regulato-
ry "requirements" referred to in the CWA include the
payment of reasonable fees.'8
A second, but equally crucial, issue arises upon
asking what characteristic(s) qualify a given fee as
"reasonable." Such an inquiry is germane because
while the CWA waives federal sovereign immunity
to "reasonable" state service charges, that waiver
does not extend to unreasonable fees on federal
activities. 9 The definition of a "reasonable fee" is
explored in Part Ill.
Parts IV through VII discuss the methodology of
distinguishing reasonable fees from unreasonable
fees (considered "taxes"). Since 1978, the malority
of federal courts have used the three-prong test out-
lined in Massachusetts v. United States20 to distinguish
reasonable state fees from impermissible state
taxes. Part IV examines the Massachusetts test in
detail. Part V argues that Massachusetts should be
relected as an unfair and ineffective measure of the
reasonableness of water quality assessments
against federal entities. Instead, federal courts
should adopt an alternative test more appropriate
to situations such as state assessments on federal
dredging prolects. Part VI suggests that the proper
test of reasonableness is found in United States v. City
of Columbia.21 The more malleable City of Columbia
test is better able to reflect the intended scope of a
given waiver of sovereign immunity than is the rigid
Massachusetts test. Furthermore, the flexibility of the
City of Columbia standard allows courts to remain
faithful to fundamental principles of federalism and
15. McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819);
Mayo v. United States. 319 US. 441 (1943).
16. Hancock v. Tram, 426 U.S. 167. 179 (1976).
17.33 U.S.C. §§ 1323(a), 1344(t). Section 404(t) applies only
to dredge/fill activities, while section 313(a) is a more generalized
waiver that includes application to dredging prolects.
18. Id.
19. § 1323(a).
20.435 U.S. 444 (1978).
21.914 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1990).
22. See I William Blackstone. Comrenianes 238-39.
23. See. e.g.. United States v. Lee. 106 U.S. 196. 207 (1882);
Roger C. Crampton. Nonstatutor Rie'w of FederalAdmintSirath'eAction:
state police power that underlie state regulatory
efforts.
Part Vii provides a brief overview of California's
statutory fee assessment structure with respect to
dredging operations (i.e.. the WDR and BPTCP pro-
grams). Part Viii follows with an analysis of such
fees under the City of Columbia test. Part IX draws two
conclusions. First, both WDR and BPTCP fees are
reasonable under City of Columbia. Second, given the
waivers of federal immunity to the payment of rea-
sonable state fees, federal entities are liable for such
fees incurred by dredging in California.
II. Sovereign Immunity And The Clean Water Act
Sovereign immunity has its roots in the English
common law principle that one cannot sue the
king.22 In the United States, both the Federal
Government and the states ordinarily enjoy immu-
nity from law suits." Concomitant with immunity
from suit is the long-accepted notion that federal
activities enjoy blanket immunity from state regula-
tion and taxation3 4
It is also well-established that Congress is able
to waive federal immunity from state regulation or
taxation by a "clear and unambiguous- mandate to
that end."5 A constitutional presumption in favor of
sovereign immunity exists, and "lalny such waiver
must be strictly construed in favor of the United
States.2 6 Courts are thus charged with interpreting
waivers of sovereign immunity narrowly, and not
enlarging the scope of such waivers beyond what
the language of the statute requires.27 However, the
Supreme Court has also instructed judges not to
"narrow the waiver that Congress intended. '' 28
Therefore. the test for courts examining the waiver
provisions of the CWA will be whether Congress has
.unequivocally expressed" a waiver of federal sover-
eign immunity With respect to payment of state
water quality fees. 9
When a court looks for a "clear and unambigu-
ous" statutory meaning, the necessary first step is
The Ned For Staiutoy Refrm c/s cS.erifn Immunity. Subject Matter
Iunrst Wn. and Parths D fenhni, 68 M:m. L REv. 389.392 (1970).
24. U.S. cm-sr. art. VI. d. 2; McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Mayo v. United States, 319 US. 441 (1943).
25. Hancockv. Train, 426 U.S. 167.179 (1976) (holding under
the Clean Air Act that federal facilities need only comply with
substantive state environmental requirements. not with mandat-
ed state procedures).
26. Ardestani v. I.NS.. 502 U.S. 129. 137 (1991).
27. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680.685-86 (1933).
28. Smith v. United States. 113 S.Ct. 1178, 1183 (1993). quat-
lng United States v. Kubnck. 444 U.S. 111. 117-18 (1979).
29. Set United States v. Idaho. 113 S.CL 1893. 1896 (1993).
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to examine the plain meaning of the statutory lan-
guage.30 In doing so, the words should be given
their"natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly under-
stood meaning."3i The form of the relevant language
must also be considered. A federal district court in
California recently summarized the two alternative
approaches Congress could take in writing a statu-
tory waiver. It found "Itlhere are two ways Congress
could express its intent to waive sovereign immuni-
ty. One, Congress could specifically list those cate-
gories which it wished to include. Two, Congress
could provide a broad waiver. There is no require-
ment that Congress express its waiver by means of
a list approach."32
In the CWA, Congress utilizes both the specific
and the broad approach. As will be discussed
below, Congress endowed the CWA with a broad yet
"clear and unambiguous" waiver of federal sover-
eign immunity to state water quality regulation. At
the same time, the CWA narrowly waives immunity
from "the payment of reasonable Istatel service
charges,"3 3 thereby combining the two approaches
outlined above.
Two waivers of federal sovereign immunity
existing in the CWA are relevant to California's
assessment of WDR and BPTCP fees: those found in
sections 313(a) and 404(t).3 4 While the section
313(a) waiver applies generally to all federal facili-
ties, the 404(t) waiver aims specifically at federal
dredge and fill activities.35 The broader application
of section 313(a) is reflected in language which, in
effect, supersedes the more particularized uses of
section 404(t) in most instances.3 6 Section 313(a),
entitled "Federal Facilities Pollution Control,"
reads:
Each department, agency, or instrumentality
of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the Federal Government (1) hav-
ing jurisdiction over any property or facili-
ty, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting,
or which may result, in the discharge or
runoff of pollutants, and each officer,
agent, or employee thereof in the perfor-
mance of his official duties, shall be subject to,
and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate,
and local requirements, administrative authority,
and process and sanctions respecting the control
and abatement of water pollution in the same man-
ner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmen-
tal entity including the payment of reasonable ser-
vice charges. The preceding sentence shall
apply (A) to any requirement whether substantive
or procedural (including any recordkeeping or
reporting requirement, any requirement
respecting permits and any other require-
ment, whatsoever), (B) to the exercise of
any Federal, State, or local administrative
authority, and (C) to any process and sanc-
tion, whether enforced in Federal, State or
local courts or in any other manner This
subsection shall apply notwithstanding any immu-
nity of such agencies, officers, agents, or employees
under any law or rule of law The President
may exempt any effluent source of any
department, agency, or instrumentality in
the executive branch from compliance with
any such a Isicl requirement if he deter-
mines it to be in the paramount interest of
the United States to do so. 3 7
In its broadest operation, section 313(a) waives fed-
eral sovereign immunity when a federal agency
engages in "any" polluting or potentially polluting
activities.3 8 Further section 313(a) commands fed-
eral entities to comply with "all" state water quality
requirements.3 9 Section 313(a)'s narrower directives
include an express waiver of immunity to "the pay-
ment of reasonable [statel service charges."40
Section 313(a) in its current form is a reaction to a
pair of 1977 Supreme Court decisions: Hancock v.
Train4i and E.P.A. v. California ex rel. State Water
Resources Control Board.4 2 In those cases the Court
found extremely narrow waivers of federal sovereign
immunity in the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water
Act, respectively.43 In each case, the Court held that
the language of the respective Acts sublected the
Federal Government to substantive state environ-
mental regulation, but not to the procedural
devices necessary to properly administer such state
30. Blum v. Stevenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984).
3 i. Thomas v. United States, 189 F. 2d 494,497 (6th Cir. 1951),
crt, denied, sum nom. United States v. Thomas. 342 U.S. 850 (1951).
32. United States v. South Coast Air Quality Management
District, 748 F. Supp. 732, 738 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
34. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1323(a), 1344(t).
35. Id.
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).




41. 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
42. 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
43. 426 U.S. 167 (1976); 426 U.S 200 (1976); 42 U.SC.
7418(a) (Clean Air Act § 118(a)); 33 U.S.C § 1323(a) (Clean Water
Act § 313(a)).
Volume 3, Num I
Fa~l1995S!Oa Ne5~n of Fe~rd Dreging Pir~ec
programs, such as payment of fees.44
The California SWRCB decision held that federal
facilities were exempt from compliance with state
permitting procedures approved by the EPA under
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES")45 because "the 'requirements'
language of [CWAJ Section 313 refers simply and
solely to substantive standards."46 At the time
California SWRCB was decided, neither section
313(a) nor 404(t) of the CWA made mention of pro-
cedure or process in relation to state regulatory
"requirements." However, in both Hancock and
California SWRCB, the Court also recognized that the
language of the two acts as interpreted left a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of effective state envi-
ronmental enforcement by exempting federal facili-
ties from state air and water pollutant discharge
permitting processes.47 Therefore, in both decisions
the Court invited Congress to clarify and strengthen
its intentions behind the statutes by amending the
relevant language. 48
A flurry of legislative activity ensued, with
Congress amending the Clean Air Act, the Clean
Water Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act in
1977 49 All three amendments broadened the
waivers of the prior statutes, specifically subjecting
the Federal Government to state procedural as well
as substantive requirements. 50 The CWA section
313(a) waiver expressly declares that the payment of
"reasonable service charges" is among those proce-
dural requirements the Federal Government is
required to comply with.51 A House Report on the
section 313(a) amendment commented, "Itihe new
section 13113 is intended to overturn the Hancock
case and to express, with sufficient clarity. the com-
mittee's desire to subject Federal facilities to all
Federal, State, and local requirements - procedural.
substantive, or otherwise - process, and sanc-
tions. "5 2 Indicating that all three amended statutes
were changed in the same spirit, then President
Jimmy Carter implemented them simultaneously
with Executive Order 12.088.53 President Carter
directed all federal agencies to comply with "applic-
able pollution control standards" and held them to
"the same substantive, procedural, and other
requirements that would apply to a private per-
son."5
4
With its dual blanket and list-style waiver, sec-
tion 313(a) effectively absorbs the activity-specific
waiver found in OVA section 404(t).55 The 404(t)
waiver of federal sovereign immunity specifically
targets dredge and fill activities undertaken by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Section 404(t) reads
as follows:
(t) Navigable waters within state jurisdic-
tion: Nothing in this section shall preclude
or deny the right of any State...agency to
control the discharge of dredged or fill
material in any portion of the navigable
44. 426 U.S. at 198-99; California SVRCB. 426 U.S. at 215.
227. Included in the Courts conception of substantive require-
ments were devices such as effluent limitations and compliance
schedules, while procedural standards included, for example,
discharge permits for federal facilities. See generally Corinne B.
Yates. Note. Limitations of Sorereign immunity Under the Clean Water
Act: Empowenng States to Confront Federal Polluters. 90 MICH. L REv.
183. 187-88 (1991).
45. The National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
('NPDES') is a discharge permitting scheme activated under the
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988). Under the NPDES. the Federal EPA
is able to issue permits to dischargers upon satisfaction of statu-
tory conditions. Id. § 1342(a). Because environmental regulation
is conducted pnmarily on the state level, the NPDES allows
states to conduct their own permitting of polluters subject to
approval and supervision by the EPA. Id. § 1342(b)-(d). See gner-
ally Rebecca Heintz. Note. Federal Sorereign Immunity and Clean
Water: A Supreme Misstep, 24 ENvn.. L 263. 277-79 (1994) ('lilt Is
clear that the CTA contemplates a dynamic cooperative relation-
ship between the federal and state governments. The federal gov-
ernment retains a substantial amount of power and oversight.
... States may. however. implement stricter standards and the EPA
can enforce these standards:).
46.426 U.S. at 215.
47. 426 U.S. at 198; 426 U.S. at 227-28.
48. In California S\VRCB. for example, the Court stated that
"[slhould it be the intent of Congress to have the EPA approve a
state NPDES program regulating federal point sources . it
may legislate to make that intention manifest. 426 U.S. at 227-
28. Seze aLo 426 U.S. at 198.
49. The Clean Air Act. Pub. L No. 95-95. § l16(a). 91 Stat.
771 (1977); the Clean WaterAct. Pub. L No. 95-217, §§ 60.61(a),
91 Stat. 1597. 1598 (1977); the Safe Drinking Water Act. Pub. L
No.95-190. § 8(a). (d), 91 Stat. 1396, 1397 (1977).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1995) (Clean Air Act): 33 U.S.C. §
1323(a) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300Ij-6) (1991) (Safe
Drinking Water Act). Despite the amendments, it is difficult to
Imagine what classification any regulatory requirement would
have if not either substantive or procedural. Together. the two
categories seem all-inclusive.
51. Pub. L No. 95-217. 91 Stat. 1606, 1598 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)). Equating 'reasonable service
charges' with vanous water quality fees does not require much of
a conceptual leap. "A regulatory, or licensing, fee. insofar as it is
reasonable, seems properly viewed as a kind of charge fora reg-
ulatory, or administrative. 'service'." Maine v. United States Navy,
973 E2d 1007. 1012 (lst Or. 1992) (Brejer CI.) (holding that the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act waives the Federal
Governments sovereign immunity to reasonable fees).
Furthermore. WEsrTa's NEw orO D:cno:a' 496 (3d ed. 1938).
defines'fee" as paynent asked or given for professiona-services
...charge
52. H.L 294. 95th Cong.,. st Sess. 199 (1977).
53. Exec. Order No. 12,038.43 Fed. Reg. 47.707 (1978).
54. Id.
55.33 U.S.C. § 1344(t).
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waters within the jurisdiction of such State,
including any activity of any Federal agency,
and each such agency shall comply with such
State requirements both substantive and proce-
dural to control the discharge of dredged or
fill material to the same extent that any person
is subject to such requirements?6
Section 313(a) applies to federal agency activity
"notwithstanding any immunity of such agencies
under any law or rule of law."' 7 The 404(t) waiver is
certainly a "law" within the meaning of section
313(a)'s language, so section 313(a) applies even
where federal dredge or fill activities are at issue.' 8
In fact, 404(t) seems effectively absorbed by 313(a),
since every activity which falls within the scope of
404(t) is also addressed by 313(a).59
There is no indication that the references to
state "requirements" in 313(a) and 404(t) are con-
ceptually exclusive of each other. In both sec-
tions, federal entities must comply with state
"requirements" which are qualified by the words
"substantive" and "procedural."60 In Parola v.
Weinberger, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, even
absent the 1977 amendments to the CWA, the
Supreme Court should have held "requirements"
to include symbiotic substantive and procedural
counterparts:
The history of the federal compliance contro-
versy instructs us that the meaning of
"requirement" cannot, as in Hancock and EPA
v. California. be limited to substantive environ-
mental standards - effluent and emissions
levels, and the like -but must also include the
procedural means by which those standards
are implemented: including permit require-
ments, reporting and monitonng duties, and
submission to state inspections.6'
Such reflection by the Weinberger court indicates that
the "requirements" language found in 313(a) and
404(t) has the same meaning, i.e., a combined sub-
stantive and procedural makeup, in both sections. 62
Even though section 404(t)'s waiver does not
expressly acknowledge the payment of fees or ser-
vice charges, it still demands compliance with all
permitting procedures. It is not uncommon for per-
mitting procedures to entail payment of fees, a fact
Congress most likely considered when it created
section 404(t). Even though section 313(a)'s broad-
er scope effectively absorbs section 404(t)'s waiver,
federal dredging activities would be subject to fee
payment under 404(t) standing alone.
In Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy,63 the
court found that "[tlwo sections of the Clean
Water Act require the Navy to comply with all
state and local requirements concerning the dis-
charge of dredged or fill materials and the control of
water pollution. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(t), 1323 (1986)."64
Friends of the Earth illustrates the Ninth Circuit
assumption that both sections 404(t) and 313(a) of
the CWA waive sovereign immunity with regard to
all state requirements. The decisional language also
implies that section 313(a) is broad enough to apply
to dredging activities without reference to section
404(t).65
Like the amended version of section 313(a),
section 404(t) was enacted in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in California SWRCB.
However, section 404(t) also represents a specific
response to the 1976 case of Minnesota v. Hoffman.66
The Hoffman court held that the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers was not required to obtain a state permit
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(t) (emphasis added).
57. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
58. The canon of statutory interpretation in which the spe-
cific provision supersedes the general provision only applies
when there is an "inescapable conflict" between the two provi-
sions. Aeron Manne Shipping Co. v. United States, 695 F2d 567,
576 (D.C. Cir. 1982). As will be discussed below, sections 404(t)
and 313(a) merely take microscopic and macroscopic views.
respectively, of the same situation (federal discharges into state
waters); they do not conflict with each other.
59. Assuming, of course, that dredge/fill activities always
involve "the discharge or runoff of pollutants" as specified in
313(a). California recognizes that the suspension of sediment as
part of dredging operations constitutes discharge of waste sub-
ject to regulation by the appropriate Regional Water Board. 32
Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 139, 140 (1958); 16 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 125,
130-31 (1950).
60. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1323(a), 1344(t).
61. Parola v. Weinberger. 848 F2d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 1988)
(emphasis in original) (holding that section 6001 of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6961, requires feder-
al installations to comply with local ordinances governing
garbage collection and disposal).
62. Congress would have to have been extremely careless to
allow identical language in provisions addressing almost Identi-
cal subjects to carry different meanings, especially after explain-
ing that the "requirements" for the Corps of Engineers are the
same as those for all other federal entitles, In addition, It Is a
maxim of statutory interpretation that 'when the same words are
used in different sections of the law, they will be given the same
meaning." Barnson v. United States, 816 E2d 549, 554 (10th Cir,
1987). cert. denied. 484 U.S. 896 (1987); see also Firestone v,
Howerton. 671 F.2d 317. 320 n.6 (9th Cir. 1982).
63. 841 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1988),
64. Id. at 929.
65. See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-830. 95th Cong., 1st Sess,
93 (1977); 13 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1934 (Dec. 28, 1977).
66.543 F.2d 1198 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977).
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or meet state water pollution control standards in
its dredging operations.67 Reacting to the Hoffman
ruling, as well as to the Hancock and Califonda
SWRCB cases, Congress emphatically constructed a
broad waiver of sovereign immunity that specifical-
ly targets federal dredge and fill activities.P
An extended passage from the legislative histo-
ry surrounding the creation of CWA section 404(t) is
instructive for its absolutely clear indication that
federal entities are subject to the same state water
quality regulations as any other discharger, includ-
ing the payment of state fees:
The [Clean Water Alct has been amended
to indicate unequivocally that all federal
facilities and activities are sublect to all of
the provisions of State and local pollution
laws. Though this was the intent of
Congress in passing the 1972 Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments,
the Supreme Court, encouraged by Federal
agencies, has misconstrued the original
intent.
The amendment to section 404 clarifies the
intent of Congress relative to the dredging
activities of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers. To maintain navigation on the
Nation's waterways is in the national inter-
est. However, corps dredging activities, like
any municipal or industrial discharge to
the Nation's waters, or any private dredg-
ing activities, should be conducted in com-
pliance with applicable State water quality
standards. The corps, like other Federal
agencies, should be bound by the same
requirements as any other discharger into
public waters.
By this amendment, the committee clan-
fies that corps dredging activities are not
exempt from State pollution abatement
requirements....tTlhe Supreme Court rul-
ing in the [Hoffrnanl case would otherwise
free corps-conducted dredging from com-
pliance with State water quality standards.
The intention of the 1972 act was not to
exempt the corps or any other public or pri-
vate agency from State water quality stan-
dards and the interpretation of section 404
.. is at variance with the intent of
Congress. In fact, Congress intended that
section 404 in the 1972 act would in its ini-
tial implementation end the open water
disposal of dredge spoil. Quite the contrary
has been the case.
Pursuant to this amendment, the corps
may be required by the States in some
instances to expend additional funds to
protect water quality. The committee sup-
ports funds for this purpose.A
Therefore, if a private dredging operation is
required to pay one or more fees to a state regula-
tory body, then Congress anticipates the payment of
those same fees by the Corps' dredging opera-
tions.7 0 Indeed, the expenditure of -additional- fed-
eral funds to protect water quality is provided for
explicitly 7 ' Finally, it is interesting to note that nei-
ther section 404(t) nor its legislative history
expressly limits the payment of state fees or service
charges to those that are -reasonable.- However
given the encompassing language of section 313(a).
and the constitutional presumption of a narrow
waiver of immunity, it is highly unlikely that
Congress meant section 404(t) to waive federal
immunity to unreasonable state feesY2
The recent history of the Clean Air Act's ("CAA)
waiver of sovereign immunity 3 is independently
instructive in deciphering the intended scope of the
Clean Water Act's waivers, particularly with regard
to the CWA section 404(t) waiver. Before 1990, sec-
tion 118(a) of the CAA contained language similar
to that found in C\VA section 404(t).Y4 The old CAA
section 118(a) stated:
Each department, agency, and instrumental-
ity of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the Federal Govemment...shall
be subject to, and comply with, all Federal,
State. interstate, and local requirements,
administrative authority, and process and
sanctions respecting the control and abate-
67. 543 F2d at 1209- Note that three lustices of the Supreme
Court dissented from the denial of certioran. arguing that even
under the pre-amendment CWA, sovereign immunity for the
Corps' dredging activities was waived under section 313 of the
CWA. 430 U.S. at 978-80.
68.33 U.S.C. § 1344(t).
69. S. REP. No. 95-370. 95th Cong.. Ist Sess. 67-8 (1977).
70. See also 33 C.RR § 336.1 (c)(10) (1993) (holds forth section
404(t) as a 'dear. explicit, and unambiguous Congressional waiv-
er of Federal sovereign immunity' in the context of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers' compliance with state water quality stan-
dards); 33 C.FR § 337.8(b)(5) (1993).
71.33 CER. § 337.8(b}(5) (1993).
72. This topic Is discussed In greater detail in part Ill.. infra.
73. Clean Air Act Section 118(a). 42 U.S.C. §7418(a) (1991).
74. Sezsupra note 56 and accompanying text.
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ment of air pollution in the same manner
and to the same extent as any nongovern-
mental entity. The preceding sentence shall
apply (A) to any requirement whether sub-
stantive or procedural (including any record-
keeping or reporting requirement, any
requirement respecting permits and any
other requirement whatsoever), (B) to the
exercise of any Federal, State, or local
administrative authority, and (C) to any
process and sanction, whether enforced in
Federal, State, or local courts or in any other
manner. This subsection shall apply notwith-
standing any immunity of such agencies,
officers, agents, or employees under any law
or rule of law. No officer, agent or employee
of the United States shall be personally
liable for any civil penalty for which he is not
otherwise liable.75
Note that the above version of section 118(a), like
section 404(t), contains no reference to fees or ser-
vice charges. In United States v. South Coast Air Quality
Management District, the court held that the pre-1990
section 118(a) waiver "contains a clear and unam-
biguous waiver of sovereign immunity with respect
to federal facilities' obligation to pay fees imposed
pursuant to the South Coast Air Quality
Management District's rules and regulations."76
One month after the South Coast decision was
issued, Congress ratified an amendment to section
118(a) of the CAA expressly codifying that court's
interpretation of the scope of the waiver.77 Congress
amended the waiver to include the requirement
that federal agencies pay any "fee or charge
imposed by any State or local agency to defray the
costs of its air pollution regulatory program."78
According to the Senate Committee Report, the
1990 amendment to section 118(a) was intended as
a clarification of pre-existing meaning, not as a
change in the scope of the waiver:
[This amendment is tol make clear that
Federal facilities are subject to fees and
charges levied by State or local agencies to
the same extent as nongovernmental enti-
ties .... The bill clarifies existing law to make
explicit what section 118 already requires: Federal
facilities are subject to the same fee
requirements that are applicable to non-
governmental agencies."7 9
The 1990 amendment thus reinforces Congress'
intention to include the payment of state fees with-
in the broader notion of substantive or procedural
state "requirements," even if fee payment is not
expressly mandated by the provision. Given the
analogous purpose, content, and structure of the
CAA and the CWA, the South Coast decision and
Congress's contemporaneous clarification of the
waiver at issue provide powerful evidence that CWA
section 404(t) mandates federal payment of state
fees where applicable.8 0
Given the language and legislative history of
sections 313(a) and 404(t) of the CWA, it is clear
that Congress intended to waive the immunity of
the Federal Government with regard to payment of
reasonable state environmental regulatory fees. By
using the qualifying word "reasonable" in reference
to the "service charges" expressly acknowledged in
the section 313(a) waiver, Congress has restricted
the scope of the waiver.81 In other words, federal
sovereign immunity under the CWA has not been
waived with regard to unreasonable fees or state taxa-
tion of federal activities. The South Coast court82
therefore erred in finding the CAA section 118(a)
waiver unlimited in all respects without first inquir-
ing into the reasonableness of the state fees at
issue.8 3 As noted by then Chief Circuit Judge
Stephen Breyer in Maine v. United States Navy:
The law has long distinguished between
reasonable state regulatory fees that apply
to the federal government and unreason-
ably high fees. The law typically treats
unreasonably high regulatory charges as
'taxes' that the Constitution forbids the
state to assess against the federal govern-
ment without explicit consent [citations
omittedl...ln the absence of any compet-
ing consideration, considerations of sim-
plicity and legal coherence militate strong-
75. 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1988).
76. 748 F. Supp. 732, 740 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
77. Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 101(e), 235, 302(d), 104 Stat.
2399, 2409, 2530. 2574 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
7418(a) (1991)).
78. Id. at 2409.
79. S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., ist Sess. 23 (1989) (empha-
sis added); see also H.R. REP. No.490, 101st Cong.. 2nd Sess. pt. i,
at 221 (1990).
80. See also 58 Op. Comp. Gen. 244. 246-48 (1979) (declaring
the U.S. Air Force liable for payment of permit and filing fees to
the Sacramento Air Pollution Control District under section
I I8(a) of the CAA. eleven years before the South Coast decision).
81. Concomitantly. section 404(t) is also restricted by impli-
cation, since the 313(a) language is so broad it absorbs the for-
mer, more specific, waiver.
82. 748 F. Supp 732 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
83. Id. at 738.
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ly in favor of interpreting Ithe Resource
Conservation and Recovery Acti consis-
tently with longstanding legal precedent in
a related area.8
Therefore, even a seemingly unlimited waiver of
sovereign immunity cannot insulate a state regula-
tory fee or charge from a constitutional reasonable-
ness analysis.
III. The Difference Between A "Tax" and A "Fee"
Assuming that, as has been argued, the Federal
Government has waived its sovereign immunity to
the payment of reasonable state water quality fees
incurred in the course of dredging projects, the
question becomes, "what 1s a fee?" Much case law
has developed surrounding the distinction between
a "fee" and a "tax." While the question has been
approached from divergent angles yielding equally
divergent outcomes, some general guiding princi-
ples can be extracted.
From the outset, note that even if a state
expressly purports to levy a fee or service charge on
a federal entity, the fee or charge will nonetheless
be considered an impermissible tax for Supremacy
Clause immunity purposes if it is found to be unrea-
sonable.85 The identification of an unreasonable fee
with a tax stems from the need to prevent states
froni justifying all charges to federal agencies by
simply labeling such charges as "fees" or "service
charges" (assuming federal sovereign immunity to
such assessments has been waived by Congress).8
A "tax" can be defined as an "enforced contri-
bution to provide for the support of government."87
Taxes are legislatively mandated and apply to all or
most of the citizenrytS Revenue from taxes is com-
monly applied to a general fund, which is used to
finance government activity benefiting the entire
population.P Thus, a defining characteristic of a tax
is that its principal purpose is to raise general rev-
enue. As will be discussed in more detail, revenue
from dredging fees collected by the SWRCB makes
up an extremely small portion of the SVRCB's over-
all budget, yet, at least with respect to BPTCP fees,
subsidizes a significant portion of the services pro-
vided to dredge/fill projects.9 Furthermore, most of
the services funded by fee payments directly or indi-
rectly benefit the individual fee payer above all oth-
ers.
A"fee," on the other hand, is "a price charged by
a governmental agency for a service or product
whose distribution it controls."9' While a fee may
also function to raise generalized revenue, its pri-
mary purpose may be administrative, regulatory, or
punitive.92 Unlike a tax, a fee or service charge is
imposed on a party who voluntarily engages in a
particular activity in order to recover the costs
imposed by that activity on the government.93 By
contrast, taxes do not necessarily function in such a
strictly compensatory manner. Different classifica-
tions of fees exist. A "regulatory fee," for example, is
one imposed by a regulatory body on a party or par-
ties subject to its regulation. 4 To be subject to reg-
ulation. however, the fee payer must have acted vol-
untarily in placing itself in that position. "lUInlike a
tax, a fee is 'incident to a voluntary act, e.g.. a
request that a public agency permit an applicant' to
84. 973 F.2d 1007. 1011-12 list Cir. 1992): see also Federal
Land Bankv. Crosland. 261 U.S. 374.378 (1923) (Holmes. 1.) (dis-
tinguishing between a reasonable fee and an excessive charge
that exceeds the requirement of support in finding the United
States immune from a state mortgage recording tax).
85. See. e.g., supra note 84 and accompanying text (Maine v.
United States Navy, 973 F2d at 1011-12).
86. See United States v. LaFranca. 282 U.S. 568. 572 (1931)
("Nlo mere exercise of the art of lexicography can alter the
essential nature of an act or a thing; and if an exaction be dearly
a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by the simple expedi-
ent of calling it such.): National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. City of
New York 882 F2d 710. 715 (2d Cir. 1988) ("ITihe label applied to
an assessment by a state or local government does not deter-
mine whether the assessment is a tax or a non-tax.).
87. 282 U.S. 568. 572 (1931); see also United States v.
Maryland. 471 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Md. 1979).
88. San Juan Cellular Tel. Co. v. Pub. Sew. Cotnm'n of Puerto
Rico. 967 E2d 683, 685 (ist Cir. 1992) (Breyer. I., affirming that a
penodic fee charged to Appellant by Respondent for serviang
Puerto Rico is a regulatory "fee" and not a "tax*) (citing National
Cable Television Ass'n v. United States. 415 U.S. 336. 340-41
(1974): Robinson Protective Alarm Co. v. City of Philadelphia. 581
F.2d 371. 376 (3d Cir. 1978)).
89. Id.
90. See Infra notes 197-198 and accompanying text
91. Clayton P Gillette. Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Feis:
A Le,1I and Econ mlc A.afrafs. 67 B.U. L RE. 795. 800 (1987: see a-o
United States v. City of Huntington. 999 F2d 71.74 (4th Cir. 1993).
92. See Butler v. State of Maine Supreme Judicial Court. 767
. Supp. 17. 19 (D. Me. 1991); American Petrofina Co. v. Nance.
859 F.2d 840.841 (10th Cir. 1983); Wright v. McClain. 835 F.2d 143.
14445 (6th Cir. 1987): Schneider Transport. Inc. v. Cattanach. 657
F.2d 128, 132 (7th Cir. 1981). eert. dented. 455 U.S. 909 (1932):
Mobile Oil Corp. v. Tully. 639 F2d 912. 918 (2d Or. 1981) cert.
dentfed. 452 U.S. 967 (1981).
93. See The Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson). 112 U.S.
580 (1884) (validating a 5fc fee collected from ship owners for
every non-citizen transported to the United States: the money
was then used to pay for the specific costs of administering the
Immigration laws): National Cable TelenIsion Ass'n. Inc. v. United
States. 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974) (holding that. while a tax is a
compulsory payment, a fee is always incident to a voluntary act
on the part of the fee-payer): McVey. Infra note 140.885-89 (1989).
94. New England Power Co. v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n. 633 F2d 12. 14 list Cir. 1932) (holding that
the NRC has power to charge nuclear reactor license applicants
fees based on agency costs).
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engage in a regulated activity, and [the applicant] is
charged for agency action which 'bestows a benefit
on the applicant, not shared by other members of
society."'95 Therefore, the regulatory fee is assessed
pursuant to a voluntary act, and confers special
benefits on the fee payer not shared by the general
public. The primary benefit received by an entity
who discharges in the course of dredging state
waterways is, of course, permission to dredge in the
first place. In addition, fee payers in California
receive numerous services from the SWRCB funded
at least in part by fee revenue.9
The distinctive nature of a fee is well-illustrated
by Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. NRC,97 in which the
Fifth Circuit considered whether the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) licensing charges
were most appropriately classified as fees or taxes. 98
The petitioners argued that the NRC's charges were
necessarily taxes because the resulting revenue
advanced the public interest as a whole, and did not
bestow any special or unique benefit upon the
license or permit applicant.99 In support of their
proposition, the petitioners claimed that the NRC's
many procedures and investigations - fueled by its
concern for public safety - undertaken in the
course of evaluating an application for "a construc-
tion permit or license to operate a nuclear facility"
would result in a broad public benefit. i°
The Mississippi Power & Light court relected the
petitioners' argument on the broad grounds that "it
ignores the realities of the operation of the nuclear
power industry."101 Drawing on the Supreme Court's
resolution of a factually similar question in National
Cable Television Assoc. v. United States,10 2 the Mississippi
Power & Light court found that a valid regulatory fee
could effectuate a strong public interest as a
byproduct without metamorphosing into a tax.O3
The special benefit to recipients of a license from
the NRC is that such a license is "an absolute pre-
requisite to operating a nuclear facility," and only
one member of society (the applicant at any given
time) is receiving that benefit. 0 4 Other unique ben-
efits accruing from an NRC license grant were cited
by the court, such as statutory limited liability and
the value of routine NRC safety inspections. 105 In its
concluding passages, the Mississippi Power & Light
court provided a summary of the three primary char-
acteristics of a fee:
First, no fee may be charged to a private
party when there is no identifiable benefi-
ciary, i.e., 'when the identification of the
ultimate beneficiary is obscure and the ser-
vice can be primarily considered as bene-
fiting broadly the general public." 06
Second, the fee assessed cannot exceed
the cost to the agency of rendering the ser-
vice. Finally, expenses incurred to serve
some 'lilndependent public interest' can-
not be included in the fee, although, as we
have already concluded, the agency may
recover the full cost of rendering a service
to a private beneficiary. 0 7
Even though Mississippi Power & Light couches its fee-
versus-tax principles in the context of public regula-
tion of a private entity, the principles are generally
applicable to an inter-sovereign taxation-versus-
service charge situation.
Other cases have imputed the limitations sur-
rounding the taxing power of the Federal
Government' 08 to monetary assessment schemes
whose main oblective is to raise revenue for the
general support of government, but not to schemes
designed for strictly regulatory purposes. The Head
Money Cases was an early example of this conceptual
divisiono 9 Instead of finding a nominal immigra-
tion charge on shipowners to be within the consti-
tutional taxing power, the Head Money Court found
the levy to be a "mere incident of the regulation of
commerce,"110 thus qualifying it as a permissible
fee.
95. Id., quoting National Cable Television Assoc v. United
States, 415 U.S. at 340-41.
96. See supra note 7.
97. 601 E2d 223 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 1102 (1980).
98. Id. at 225.
99. Id. at 227, 228.
100. Id. at 228, quoting Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Intl Union
of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 402 (1961).
101. Id. at 228.
102. 415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974). National Cable held that the
FCC had the authority to assess annual fees to community
antenna television system subscribers, even though the FCC's
primary role is to protect the public interest.
103. 601 F.2d at 228-29.
104. Id. at 229.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 230, quoting Federal Power Comm'n v, New
England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345,350 (1974), quoting BUREAU OF THE
BuDGET CIRCULAR A-25, Sept. 23, 1959.
107. Id.. citing Electronic Industries Ass'n v. FC.C,. 554 F2d
1109. 1114-15 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See generally Patrick A. Genzler,
Federal Payment of State Environmental Fees, 38 NAVAL L. RE.V, 149, 7-15
(Westlaw pagination) (1989).
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
109. 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884). See supra note 93.
110. Id., See also South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d
874 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that a charge designed to reimburse
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In Brock v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority, I the court employed the purpose-of-the-
charge analysis with regard to a workers' compensa-
tion assessment on the Transit Authority.112 The
court concluded that the primary purpose of the
assessment was to regulate liability for industrial
accidents, not to finance general operations of the
Transit Authority (as would a tax).'13 The Brock court
formulated as a general rule "that a levy is properly
defined as a 'tax' within the meaning of the ITransit
Authority's statutory immunity from taxation] when
its principal purpose is to raise revenue, not to reg-
ulate activities."'14
It should also be noted that early Supreme
Court cases found any increased economic burden
imposed on the Federal Government through state
taxation to be an impermissible violation of the
Supremacy Clause.'1 5 However. later cases made
finer distinctions within the "economic burden on
the Federal Government" rubric for tax immunity
purposes.11 6 One commentator suggests that the
major distinction is drawn between the legal and
economic consequences of a state tax affecting the
Federal Government: [Flor the purpose of determin-
ing whether federal immunity from state taxation
has been violated, the Supreme court has estab-
lished an important distinction between the legal
incidence of a tax and what might be termed the
'economic incidence,' or the ultimate economic
consequences of a tax."7 Various mitigating circum-
the costs of regulating from those being regulated Is not a tax
subject to the Constitution's article I. section 8 limitations);
United States v. Stangland. 242 F.2d 843. 848 (7th Cir. 19573;
Rogersv. United States. 138 F2d 992.994-95 (6th Cir. 1943); Moon
v. Freeman. 379 E2d 382, 390-92 (9th Cir. 1967).
111. 796 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
112. Id. at 487.
113. Id. at 489.
114. Id. at 488. This purpose-oriented rule was recently used
in Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Public Utility omm'n of tFe State pf Oregn,
in which the railroad sought declaratory judgment that Oregon's
railroad levy was an impermissible. discriminatory tax. 899 E2d
854. 855-56 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit held that the levy
was not a tax because its purpose was to 'recoup the costs of a
regulatory program from members of the industry regulated,
rather than to raise general revenues.' Id. at 859.
115. Weston v. City Council of Charleston. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
449 (1829) (Marshall, Cf.). See lacqueline M. Moen. Note. Federal
Immunity and thle Arizona Transaction Privilege Tax on Pnme Contracting:
IsAnzona'sTax Unconstitutional?, 34 ARiz. L REv. 615,617 n.15 (1992).
116. See. e.g.. United States v. New Mexico. 455 U.S. 720
(1982); United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964): lames v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
117. Supra note 115. at 617.
118. The 1952 Act, 65 Stat. 290. codified at 31 U.S.C. §
483(a). stated in part-
it is the sense of Congress that any work. service...ben-
stances, purposes, and manifestations of a state tax
might suffice to prevent it fr6m being deemed
impermissible by the courts, even when it results in
a greater economic burden on the Federal
Government.
For the last four decades, much of the case law
seeking to differentiate user fees from taxes has
been in response to the passage of the Independent
Offices Appropriation Act (hereinafter "IOAA7).
Enacted in 1952. the IOAA was intended to provide
guidelines for federal agencies to use in assessing
user fees.118 One commentator summarizes the con-
clusions of this body of case law by reiterating the
three analytical factors cited in Mississifi Power &
Ught." 9 First. the 'value or benefit to the user" is
noted to be quite broad in its practical application.
in particular when the services are rendered by the
Federal Government pursuant to statutory authori-
ty.i2o Second. the "cost to the government" is found
to require only a 'reasonable relationship or
"approximation" of the costs to the benefits of the
service.121 Third. the -identifiable beneficiary" of the
service must experience a certain degree of private
benefit as a result of the service, even if an inciden-
tal public benefit also results.' 2
The cases on the tax versus fee question thus
far described have primarily concerned assessment
of charges on private parties by federal administra-
tive agencies. In fact. much of the case law evolved
out of the federal attempt to codify user fee assess-
efit....license.. or similar thing of value or utility per-
formed, fumished, provided. granted...by any Federal
agency...to or for any person...shall be self-sustaining
to the full extent possible, and the head of each Federal
agency Is authorized by regulation...to prescribe there-
for...such fee. charge, or price. if any. as he shall deter-
mine...to be fair and equitable taking into consideration
direct and indirect cost to the Government. value to the
recipient, public policy or Interest served, and other per-
tinent facts.
In 1982, Congress recodified the abov'e section of the IO.AA. but
retained the same operative language. 31 U.S.C. § 9701. Pub. L
No. 97-258. 96 StaL 1051 (1982).
119. Gender. supra note 107. at 9-10.
120. Id. at 9.
121. Id. &z also United States v. Sperry Corp.. 493 U.S. 52.60
(1989). a reconfirmation that a precise correlation of costs to ben-
efits Is not required:
This Court has neer held that the amount of a user fee
must be precisely calibrated to the use that a party
makes of government services. Nor does the
Government need to record Invoices and billable hours
to justify the cost of its services. All that we have
required is that the user fee be a 'fair approximation of
the cost of benefits supplied.'
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ment criteria in the IOAA. The final, and most cOm-
monly applied test to discriminate between fees
and taxes arose from a fact pattern in which a fed-
eral charge was levied on state interests. This is the
Massachusetts v. United States test. 23
IV. The Massachusetts DecIsIon
In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court used a
three-part test to determine whether an aircraft reg-
istration charge, assessed by the Federal
Government under the.Airport and Airway Revenue
Act of 1970124 against state-owned aircraft, was per-
missible under principles of intergovernmental tax
immunity.125 The State of Massachusetts argued
that the federal aviation fee violated the State's sov-
ereign immunity to any federal tax levied on "essen-
tial state functions."126 The Court rejected
Massachusetts' position, stating that:
The principles that have animated the
development of the doctrine of state tax
immunity and the decisions of this Court in
analogous contexts persuade us that a
State enjoys no constitutional immunity
from a nondiscriminatory revenue mea-
sure, like Ithe federal aviation taxi, which
operates only to ensure that each member
of a class of special beneficiaries of a fed-
eral program pay a reasonable approxima-
tion of its fair share of the cost of the pro-
gram to the National Government. 127
In denying the State's claim, the Court surveyed the
history of intergovernmental tax immunity and
emphasized the differences in the origin and scope
of immunities enjoyed by the states and National
Government, respectively. 28 The Court went so far
as to authorize any federal taxation imposed on a
state that "could never seriously threaten the con-
tinued functioning" of that state. Such a tax would
be "outside the scope of the implied tax immuni-
ty."12 9
Notwithstanding its finding of a severely
restricted scope of implied state sovereign immuni-
ty from federal taxation, the Court went on to detail
a three-part test that has become the dominant test
for distinguishing a user fee from a tax in any con-
text. 130 The Court's additional analysis might seem
extraneous, given that the Court had just "estab-
lished that taxes that operate as user fees may con-
stitutionally be applied to the States. 13 1 If a tax that
is functionally equivalent to a user fee need only
satisfy the very broad criterion (that it will not "seri-
ously threaten the continued functioning" of a state
as a state) in order to be constitutional, then what
need was there to differentiate between a user fee
and a tax? In other words, if the overriding constitu-
tional criterion is whether the charge in question
seriously threatens state sovereignty, why draw finer
distinctions between fees and taxes?
The answer is that there was no such need in
Massachusetts. The Court was addressing
Massachusetts' claim that the federal aviation
charge "should not be treated as a user fee because
the amount of the tax is a flat annual fee and hence
is not directly related to the degree of use of the air-
ways." 132 However, the Massachusetts Court did not
address the State's argument head-on. Instead of
defining the boundary line between reasonable fee
and impermissible tax, the Court focused on the
constitutionality of any revenue measure, regard-
less of its semantic classification. The doctrinal core
of the case, the three-part test, reads as follows:
Whatever the present scope of the constitu-
tional principle of state tax immunity, a
State can have no objection to a revenue
measure that satisfies the Ifollowing]
three-prong test. So long as the charges
Ill do not discriminate against state func-
tions, 121 are based on a fair approximation
of use of the system, and 131 are structured
to produce revenues that will not exceed
the total cost to the Federal Government of
the benefits to be supplied, there can be no
substantial basis for a claim that the National
Government will be using its taxing powers to con-
trol, unduly interfere with, or destroy a State's abil-
ity to perform essential services.133
123. 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
124. 26 U.S.C. § 4491, repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§280(c)(1), 96 Stat. 564 (1982).
125. 435 U.S. at 446.
126. Id. at 453-54.
127. Id. at 454.
128. Id. at 454-460; see Section V; infra notes 136-142 and
accompanying text.
129. 435 U.S. at 460.
130. Id. at 466-67.
131. Id. at 463.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 466-67 (emphasis added), This three-prong test
onginated in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. v, Delta
Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972) (holding that a per-passenger "use
and service" charge on commercial aircraft using the airport was
valid upon satisfaction of the three prongs: non-discriminatory,
based on fair approximation of use, and not excessive relative to
the cost of providing the benefit(s)).
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Therefore, the Massachusetts Court did not really dif-
ferentiate fees from taxes. It merely presented three
criteria by which the constitutionality of any federal
revenue measure can be gauged.
V. Why the Massachusetts Test Is Inapplicable
to the Instant Situation
Two principal reasons support the assertion
that the Massachusetts holding is ineffective when
applied to a federal, as opposed to a state, waiver of
sovereign immunity. First, federal sovereign immu-
nity. as discussed below, has a different origin and
scope than state sovereign immunity (the topic of
Massachusetts v. United States). Second. a statutory
waiver exists only by virtue of its semantics and ter-
minology, characteristics Massachusetts does not take
into account.
The Massachusetts Court had a different agenda
than did the courts that decided the body of case
law considered in Section I1, above. Instead of
defining the point at which a federal user fee
becomes a federal tax, the Court in Massachusetts was
concerned with the point at which any federal rev-
enue measure becomes a violation of state sover-
eignty. The tax/fee distinction is swallowed up by
the limited nature of state sovereign immunity to
federal taxation as read by the Massachusetts Court.
Some background about the different sources of
sovereign immunity retained by states and by the
Federal Government is necessary to understand the
limited applicability of Massachusetts.
The examination of federal sovereign immunity
waivers in the CWA reveals that Congress has not
134. See supra Section I. However. Congress can waive sov-
ereign immunity to state taxation as well as to state fees or ser-
vice charges, and has done so periodically. See. e.g., the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021d~b)(l)B) (1994).
135. McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 WheaL) 316 (1819)
(holding a discriminatory state tax on the Bank of the United
States to be invalid). Noting that 'the power to tax Involves the
power to destroy.' Chief Justice Marshall recognized that sover-
eign immunity from taxation contributed to the maintenance of a
dual sovereign federalist system. Id. at 431. In a later case, the
Court stated that-
ITihe very nature of our constitutional system of dual
sovereign governments is such as impliedly to prohibit
the federal government from taxing the instrumentali-
ties of a state govemment, and in a similar manner to
limit the power of the states to tax the Instrumentalities
of the federal government.
Metcalf & Eddyv. Mitchell. 269 U.S. 514, 521 (1926). Sce generally 1.
NowA, R. ROTUNDA. TREATSE ON CONSrnloNAt. I.Aw: SussT~cE &
PROCEDURE § 13.9 (2d ed. 1992).
136. U.S. CONs. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
consented to state taxation of. nor assessment of
unreasonable fees on, federal facilities.' 34 The waiv-
er pattern in the CWA is thus consistent with the
long-recognized form of federal intergovernmental
immunity. 135 For the National Government, the
Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution is the source of its immunity to taxa-
tion at the hands of the states.136
Following its decision in McCulloch v. Maryland,137
the Supreme Court has consistently recognized two
principal factors when analyzing the immunity of
federal instrumentalities from state taxation. These
factors are absent in.the reverse analysis, i.e., when
state immunity from federal taxation is at issue.
Given the omnipresent influence of the Supremacy
Clause, the validity of state attempts to tax federal
entities must depend upon: 1) the ability of
Congress to create the federal instrumentality being
taxed and 2) Congress' intent to protect that instru-
mentality from taxation at the hands of a state or
states.38 However, one could easily, and perhaps
more correctly, state that the validity of state taxa-
tion rests on a different set of conditions: 1) the
ability of Congress to create the taxable instrumen-
tality and 2) a lack of Congressional waiver of feder-
al immunity to state taxation. In any case, the state-
tax-on-federal-entity situation is not of the same
nature and origin as the federal-tax-on-state-entity
situation.13 The former situation is the one occa-
sioned by the assessment of state fees upon feder-
al dredging projects in California.
Unlike its federal counterpart, state immunity
to federal taxation is not derived from an express
constitutional provision. Instead, state immunity is
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the judges in every State shall bebound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Lawts of any
State to the Contray notwithstanding.
The states do have a general constitutional right to tax other enti-
ties within their respective Jurisdictions, howeuer This right is
generated from the Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution: 'The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution. nor prohibited by it to the States. are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people: U.S. o:=t amend. X.
137. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
138. Helvering v. Gerhardt. 304 U.S. 405. 41 n.l (1938)
(holding that a federal income tax on state port authority
employees does not obstruct any essential state governmental
function and is therefore within the constitutional taxing power
of the Federal Govemment).
139. Another difference between the two scenarios pointed
out by Chief justice Marshall In McCuIFdi v. Maryini was that
national taxes on states are Instigated and controlled by the state
representatives in Congress, whereas state taxes on federal bod-
ies effectively impose taxes on people who play no role in the tax-
Ing states legislative process. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316.335-36.
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inferred from the federalist organization of the
nation. 40 Therefore, while the Constitution grants
immunity from state taxation to the Federal
Government, state immunity from federal taxation
is more limited. 141 The generally accepted test of
state sovereign immunity from federal taxation is
whether a federal tax "is destructive of state sover-
eignty."142 Therefore, not only do federal and state
immunity from reciprocal taxation derive from dif-
ferent sources, but the scope of the respective sov-
ereigns' immunity is widely divergent. Massachusetts
presented a federal-charge-on-state-entity situa-
tion. The sovereign immunity at issue was that of
the State. As a result, Massachusetts did little more
than supply a three-prong test which bolstered and
refined the basic premise that a state is not immune
to federal fees or federal taxes, as long as those
charges are not discriminatory or do not actually
impair state functions.
A different type of sovereign immunity is at
issue in the dredging context, where a federal
agency is the subject of a state assessment.
Because a state is issuing the charges, the federal
agency is protected by its blanket immunity to state
taxation and regulation under the Supremacy
Clause, subject to a valid waiver of federal sovereign
immunity. The Massachusetts three prong test, along
with the underlying standard regarding essential
state functions, is subsumed by the far more com-
prehensive federal sovereign immunity.
Case law is unclear on the applicability of
Massachusetts. Federal courts have not reached a con-
sensus as to the scope and proper application of
Massachusetts, particularly in regard to the nature of
state assessments. In 1993, fifteen years after
Massachusetts was decided, the Fourth Circuit stated
in United States v. City of Huntington-that "lailthough
the Supreme Court has never established a specific
standard for determining when a particular [state or
locall assessment is a tax, the Court has consis-
tently adhered to the general rule that what must be
considered is 'the real nature of the tax and its
effect upon the federal right asserted." 143Although
the City of Huntington court did not precisely address
the issue of whether the three-part test in
Massachusetts is suitable for application in a state-
charge-to-federal-agency situation, the court appar-
ently assumed that the Massachusetts decision does
not even consider the ramifications of a state tax on
a federal entity.
Furthermore, because Congress waived federal
immunity to state water quality fees/service charges
(but not to state taxation), the issue becomes pre-
cisely what characteristics differentiate a fee from a
tax for purposes of that waiver's language. More
finely-tuned and specific categories of assessments,
in contrast to the generalized "revenue measure"
considered in Massachusetts, need to be evaluated. It
is unlikely that the Massachusetts Court had statutory
waivers in mind when it endorsed its three-prong
test. Therefore, the Massachusetts test is not the
appropriate test to use when differentiating a fee
from a tax for purposes of state assessments
against a federal entity, particularly when a specific
waiver of federal sovereign immunity is involved.
When applied to a determination of the nature
of a state charge on a federal entity, the Massachusetts
test is unable to accommodate the element of
statutory interpretation that must, by necessity, be
introduced into any analysis used. When presented
with a state tax on a federal body, the threshold
question is whether a waiver of federal sovereign
immunity exists, and if so, what is its scope, 44
Because the exact wording of a waiver is crucial and
may vary from statute to statute, the rigid and pre-
determined Massachusetts test is an inappropriate
means of determining whether a state charge falls
within the scope of the waiver. Equally troublesome
is the fact that Massachusetts does not truly distin-
guish a fee from a tax while a statutory waiver may
well do so. In the sense of providing a satisfactory
guide to statutory langauge, Massachusetts is not
definitive enough.
Congress can choose to shape its waivers in
any way it sees fit. A federal waiver may be unlimit-
ed in scope, in which case no test is needed at all
140. See Helvenng v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 412-13, 416
(1937) (discussing the difference between the power of states to
tax federal instrumentalities and the power of the national gov-
ernment to tax state instrumentalities). See generally Maureen
Mahoney, Federal Immunity From State Taxation: A Reassessment, 45 U.
CHi. L. REv. 695 (1978); Samuel D. McVey, State Environmental Permit
Fees Charged to Federal Facilities: Distinguishing Legal User Fees from Illegal
Taxts, 29 SANTA CLARA L. Rxv. 879, 882 n.14 (1989).
141. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 135, at § 13.9.
142. Id. at 312. Originally, courts tned to distinguish essen-
tial elements of state sovereignty by way of a "governmental" ver-
sus 'proprietary" function test. Id. However, in New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572. 583. 586. 590-96 (1946), every member of a
divided Court found the governmental/ proprietary distinction to
be of little practical use and renounced future applications of the
test.
143. United States v. City of Huntington, 999 F2d 71, 73 (4th
Cir. 1993) (finding the city's municipal service charge to be a tax
rather than a fee, given the federal agencies' status as property
owners and not mere users of city services), quoting United States
v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174. 184 (1944), quoting Carpenter v
Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367-68 (1930),
144. If no applicable waiver of federal sovereign Immunity
exists, then the fee versus tax Issue will not even arise given the
Federal Government's blanket Immunity from state taxation or
regulation.
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since sovereign immunity to everything is waived.
On the other hand, a waiver may be very narrow, in
which case satisfying the Massachusetts test could
still fail to define the nature of the charge by impos-
ing too broad a standard. For example, if a federal
statute only waived immunity to a flat fee in a spe-
cific situation, a variable state fee might be deemed
reasonable under the Massachusetts guidelines but
excessive or unreasonable (and thus a "tax) under
the explicit terms of the waiver.
VI. What Kind of Reasonableness Test Is Needed
In Order To Define the Nature of the SWRCB
Charges on Federal Dredging
Because the scope of an immunity waiver is
sublect only to the intent of Congress, the ideal test
for distinguishing a state fee from a state tax
(assuming federal sovereign immunity to the former
but not the latter has been waived) is one which is
malleable enough to apply to any degree of waiver
while retaining the ability to make a useful distinc-
tion between reasonable and unreasonable fees.
The above discussion of the flaws inherent in apply-
ing the Massachusetts test to a waiver of federal sov-
ereign immunity supports the need for such a flexi-
ble test.
A proper measure of the nature of state water
quality charges to federal entities should also
acknowledge the fundamental power of the states
to police their individual environments. 145 While
states cannot subject federal entities to regulation
absent a waiver, given a waiver, the traditional
boundaries of state police power should govern the
regulation at issue. In the case of economic and
environmental regulation, the "rational basis" stan-
dard defines the boundaries of permissible state
activity and should be implicit in the "ideal" test of
reasonableness. 46
145. See, e.g., 16AAM. luR. 2D Constitutional Law § 421 (1979):
State or local regulations for the protection of the natur-
al environment or the ecology of an area are within the
scope of the police power. Thus, for example, air and
water pollution control programs have generally
been sustained as valid exercises of the police power....
in the case of an exerase of the police power In a fash-
ion designed to protect the natural environment, the
test s ... whether the legislative body could have deter-
mined on any reasonable basis that the legislation is
necessary or desirable for its Intended purpose.
See specifically CAL. WAm CODE § 13000 (West 1992):
The Legislature finds and declares that the people of the
state have a pnmary interest in the conservation, con-
trol. and utilization of the water resources of the state.
and that the quality of all the waters of the state shall be
protected for use and enioyment by the people of the
state.
In the context of state environmental legisla-
tion, the protection of the state's resources must be
carefully balanced against the myriad of economic
interests, concerns, and considerations that are
affected by such decisions. The amounts of the var-
ious regulatory permit and license fees Created and
set by the California S\WRCB are the result of weigh-
ing a wide variety of factors. These factors include
the cost of the service provided by the SVRCB, the
amount of supplemental funding allocated to the
SWRCB by the California Legislature, and the eco-
nomic and environmental impacts on the rest of the
State resulting from the creation of incentives or
disiicentives for certain actions by potential feep-
ayers. In addition, specific instances of WDR fees
are calculated according to such factors as total
water flow, volume, and area involved. 47 BPTCP fee
amounts take into account "the relative threat to
water quality from point and nonpoint discharg-
ers.- 148 Federal concerns about discrimination and
cost-benefit ratios implicit in state regulatory
assessments should not be judged according to an
inflexible, bright-line test such as that stated in
Massachusetts. but rather by the traditional constitu-
tional standard governing state legislation: the
rational basis test. 4 9 The Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that while the exercise of state police
power in the economic and environmental spheres
cannot rest on arbitrary classifications, classifica-
tions that have a rational basis in the purpose of the
legislation are constitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment150
The Court maintains that:
IAI State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the clas-
sifications made by its laws are imperfect.
If the classification had some 'reasonable
basis,' it does not offend the Constitution
146. For example, in A Ld S:ores cfOh. Inc. v. B:,rwrs. 358 U.S.
522 (1959). the Court upheld an Ohio statute that encouraged
nonresidents to establish distribution warehouses in the state by
providing a specialized tax exemption. In finding that the statute
advanced the reasonable legislative purpose of advancing the
state economy, the Court stated that "itlhe State must proceed
upon a rational basis . . ITIhe classification 'must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation." Id. at 527. quoting Ro(yster Guano
Co. v. Virginia. 253 U.S. 412.415 (1920).
147. CAL. WARm COD-s § 13260(d](1) (West Supp. 1995).
148. CAL. WATE Conz § 13396.5(b) (West Supp. 1995).
149. For purposes of this Note. federal preemption of state
law and dormant commerce clause issues are presumed to have
no bearing on the reasonableness" of state environmental regu-
lation and fees.
150: U.S. Co:sL amend. XIV; sez. e.g.. Allied Stores of Ohio.
Inc. v. Bowers. 358 U.S. 522 (1958).
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simply because the classification 'is not
made with mathematical nicety or because
in practice it results in some inequality.'
Icitation omittedl 'The problems of govern-
ment are practical ones and may justify, if
they do not require, rough accommoda-
tions - illogical, it may be, and unscientif-
ic.' Icitation omitted] .... [The rational basis
standard] is true to the principle that the
Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal
courts no power to impose upon the States
their views of what constitutes wise eco-
nomic ... policy. i5
If the Federal Government waives its sovereign
immunity to "reasonable service charges," as it does
in the section 313(a) of the Clean Water Act, then
the reasonableness of state service charges is best
measured by observing the traditional constitution-
al boundaries of permissible state legislation. To
maintain otherwise represents a substantial weak-
ening of the concept of a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity. If the states are not free to set regulatory fee
rates for federal subjects in the same way they set
non-federal subjects' rates (within constitutional
limits), the very nature of the fees to which the
Federal Government waives its immunity is being at
least partially predetermined by the Federal
Government itself. 15 2
Of course, the rational basis test by itself does
not and cannot distinguish reasonable fees from
unreasonable fees (i.e., taxes). It merely provides a
perspective from which to oversee the constitution-
ality of state environmental legislation. The need to
differentiate reasonable fees from impermissible
taxes remains due to the need to enforce statutory
language. Therefore, a test is needed which can do
so while allowing the states their due sovereignty.
VII. A Proper Test: United States v. City of Columbia
In 1990, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
declined to apply the Massachusetts three-prong test
in the federal sovereign immunity situation pre-
sented in United States v. City of Columbia,153 In City of
Columbia, the Federal Government claimed that the
portion of the city's utility rate charged to the local
federal Veterans Administration Hospital was an
unconstitutional tax under the Supremacy
Clause. 154 In factual contrast with Massachusetts, City
of Columbia involved a municipal charge to a federal
facility and a cause of action grounded in the
Supremacy Clause. The City of Columbia court held
that the utility charge was not a tax, but rather a
utility rate owed to the vendor city by the vendee
hospital. 15
As is the situation in all cases where a federal
entity is taxed or regulated by another sovereign,
the Federal Government had to waive its sovereign
immunity in City of Columbia as well. The applicable
waiver of federal sovereign immunity did not have a
statutory origin; it derived from the government's
voluntary, contractual relationship with
Columbia. 156 Thus, the relationship that existed
between the city and the Veterans Administration
was in line with the relationships commonly associ-
ated with fee, rather than tax, assessments.'5 The
Veterans Administration voluntarily chose to locate
its hospital in Columbia and purchase city services
such as water and electricity. One of the distin-
guishing features of a fee is that it is "incident to a
voluntary act."5 8
Ultimately, the City of Columbia court settled on
a test for differentiating a fee from a tax which is,
appropriately, more a methodology than a checklist
of characteristics to satisfy. The court's broad
approach allowed consideration of the basic defini-
tions of fees and taxes 59 while also taking into
account the specific factual situation and the con-
stitutional scope of the state's police power. The
151. Dandridge v. Williams. 397 U.S. 471. 485-86 (1970); see
also Licari v, C.I.R., 946 F.2d 690, 692 (9th Cir. 1991); Regan v.
Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547
(1983); Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231. 237 (1954);
Barbierv. Connolly. 113 U.S. 27. 31 (1885).
152. It is interesting to note that the case from which
Massachusetts culled its three-prong test, Evansville Airport Auth.
Distrct v. Delta Airlines, involved assessment of a user fee by the
Airport Authority that was rife with exemptions acceptable under
the Fourteenth Amendment rational basis test but perhaps
impermissible in the post-Massachusetts era. 405 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1972). The Evansville Court stated:
Because they do reflect a rational measure of relative
use, these exceptions and exemptions are also consis-
tent with the requirement of the Equal Protection
Clause, that "in defining a class subject to legislation.
the distinctions that are drawn have 'some relevance to
the purpose for which the classification Is made,"'
405 U.S. at 719 n.13. quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S, 305, 309
(1966).
153. 914 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1990).
154. Id. at 152-53.
155. Id. at 156.
156. Id.
157. See-Section III, supra.
158. National Cable Television Ass'n v. FC.C., 554 F.2d 1094,
1102 (D.C. Cir. 1992). See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Maryland, 471 F. Supp. 1030,
1036 (D. Md. 1979); United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572
(1931).
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City of Columbia court held that "it is our task to con-
sider all the facts and circumstances of record in the
case and assess them on the basis of the economic
realities to determine the essential nature of the
[charge in questionl."16°
By embracing City of Columbia's challenge to
look to the factually-generated economic realities
of a situation, courts would be able to infuse prag-
matic considerations into their judgments. Critics
of the City of Columbia test may argue that it is far too
generalized to be of practical use. To the contrary,
courts following City of Columbia will be free to refer-
ence other, more specific tax-versus-fee tests in the
course of reaching decisions. Such specific stan-
dards include, but are not limited to. the
Massachusetts elements. For example, in United States
v. City of Huntington.i6i the United States appealed an
order mandating federal payment of a municipal
charge for local services such as police and fire pro-
tection. 62 The Fourth Circuit held that the service
charge was a tax to which the United States had not
waived its sovereign immunity 63 However. the City
of Huntington court clothed its inquiry in the City of
Columbia methodology.'64
Use of the broad City of Columbia directive
allowed the City of Huntington court to focus on the
traditional distinctions between fees and taxes
while avoiding the result-skewing implications of
the more rigid Massachusetts test. The court specifi-
cally considered and rejected two alternative
approaches to fee-tax differentiation. The first test
asks whether the charge "is an enforced contribu-
tion to provide for the support of government."' 65
That test was rejected on the grounds that it would
be too simplistic a solution to say that a fee is not
a tax only because it is intended to reimburse the
city for funds expended in the course of police and
fire protection 66 The other test considered and
rejected was the three-prong Massachusetts test. 67 In
denying application of the Massachusetts test, the
court made note of the test's origin in federal taxa-
tion of state government cases: "Inasmuch as 'the
160. 914 E2d at 154.
161. 999 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1993).
162. Id. at 72.
163. Id. at 74.
164. 'The proper analysis to arve at the real nature of the
assessment is to examine 'all the facts and circumstances...and
assess them on the basis of economic realities...." Id. at 73.
165. Id. at 73 n.5. citing U ited States v. Maryland. 471 F.
Supp. 1030, 1036 (D. Md. 1979).
166. Id.
167. id.
168. Id.. citing U ited States v. City of Columbia. 914 F.2d at
states' immunity from federal taxation is more lim-
ited than the federal government's immunity from
state taxation, and is based on a different constitu-
tional source, Icitation omittedl, we are of the opin-
ion that the IMassachusettsl test is inapplicable
here.'"e6
By following the lead of City of Columbia, the City
of Huntington court was able to draw its conclusion
from a variety of legal and factual considerations
that would otherwise have been precluded. For
example, the court borrowed the definition of a tax
used in bankruptcy proceedings 69 and used it as a
measunng tool. Furthermore, even though it reject-
ed the exclusive application of the "tax as an enforced
contribution to government" test. the court did con-
sider that definition as well as the fact that a fee is
paid in return for a benefit provided by the govern-
ment.? 0 Finally, the City of Huntington analysis rest-
ed on consideration of factual circumstances such
as the government's status as a property owner and
not strictly a user of city services.Ili
ViII. Statutory Fee Requirements for Dredging In
California
Once the boundary line between reasonable
fees and impermissible taxes has been sketched in,
it is easier to assess the nature of the SWRCB
charges on federal dredging projects in California.
The two statutory provisions of the California Water
Code that bear on payment of fees by federal enti-
ties engaged in dredging state waterways are there-
fore considered next.
Section 13260 of the California Water Code gov-
erns the payment of Waste Discharge Requirement
(WDR) fees. 72 Subsection (d)(1) of section 13260
states:
Each person for whom waste discharge
requirements have been prescribed pur-
suant to section 13263 shall submit an
annual fee not to exceed ten thousand dol-
153-54 and United States v. Maine, 524 E Supp. 1056 (D. Me.
1981) (borrowing its test from mwaA.usetts).
169. -(a) An Involuntary pecuniary burden, regardless of
name, laid upon individuals or property: (b) Imposed bty. or under
the authority of the legislature: (c) For public purposes, including
the purpose ofdefraying expenses of government of undertakings
authorized by it. and (d) Under the police or taxing power of the
state. Id. at 73 nA. qu ving In Re Lorber Industries, 675 F2d 1062.
1066 (9th Cir. 1982).
170. Id. at 74. citing United States v. LaFranca. 282 US. 568.
572(1931).
171. Id. at 74.
172. CAL. WmE CoDz. § 13260 (West Supp. 1995).
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lars ($10,000) according to a reasonable fee
schedule established by the state board.
Fees shall be calculated on the basis of
total flow, volume, number of animals, or
area involved. 7 3
Subsection (d)(2) of Section 13260 establishes the
Waste Discharge Permit Fund, into which all col-
lected fees are deposited. 74 WDR fees assessed
under section 13260 are regulated by Subchapter 9,
of Chapter 3 of Title 3, section 2200 of the California
Code of Regulations, entitled 'Waste Discharge
Reports and Requirements."'' 5 Dredge/fill projects
have a separate fee scale based on an area-volume
formula rather than the "threat-complexity" scale
used for other types of discharges. 17 6 The fees that
apply to federal dredging projects are assessed on a
flat fee/volumetric basis.
Two statutory exemptions from the WDR fees
exist as subsections to section 13260.77 The two
provisions exempt confined animal feedlots (most-
ly dairies) and oil/gas/geothermal injection well
operations, respectively, from payment of WDR
fees. 17 8 However, confined animal feedlots are still
subject to a $2000 filing fee that must accompany
each report of waste discharge submitted to one of
the Regional State Water Boards 7 9 Furthermore,
only those oil, gas, and geothermal injection well
operations regulated by the Division of Oil and Gas
of the Department of Conservation are exempted
from payment of fees under section 13260.180
Section 13396.5 of the California Water Code
established the Bay Protection and Toxic Cleanup
Plan (BPTCP).' 8' BPTCP fees are collected on an
annual basis, and apply to all point and nonpoint
dischargers into enclosed bays, estuaries, and the
Pacific Ocean 82 BPTCP fees may be assessed in
addition to WDR fees, but are subject to a statutori-
ly-imposed ceiling of $30,000 "per discharger."83
According to the California Legislature, the BPTCP
is intenddd to:
[Plrovide maximum protection for existing
and future beneficial uses of bay and estuar-
me waters, and that these programs include
a plan for remedial action at toxic hot spots.
It is also the intent of the Legislature that
these programs further compliance with fed-
eral law pertaining to the identification of
waters where the protection and propaga-
tion of shellfish, fish, and wildlife are threat-
ened by toxic pollutants and contribute to
the development of effective strategies to
control these pollutants. 4
In addition to the above statement of purpose, the
BPTCP is also designed as an incentive system
aimed at reducing harmful discharges. 18' Beyond
the statutory statements of purpose, the SWRCB
relates that BPTCP fees will be used to:
Develop and maintain a program to identify
toxic hot spots, plan for their cleanup or
mitigation, and amend water quality control
plans and policies to abate toxic hot spots;
Formulate, adopt and amend the water
quality control plan for enclosed bays and
estuaries; Review and, if necessary, revise
waste discharge requirements to conform to
the plan; Develop a database of toxic hot
spots; Develop an ongoing statewide moni-
toring and surveillance program; Develop
sediment quality objectives; Develop crite-
ria for the assessment and priority ranking
of toxic hot spots; and Develop regional and
statewide toxic hot spot cleanup plans.186
173. CAL. WATER CODE § 13260(d)(1). Section 13263 merely
gives regional water boards the autnority to prescribe require-
ments related to any discharge. CAL. WATER CODE § 13263 (West
Supp. 1995).
174. CAL.. WATER CODE § 13260(d)(2) (West Supp. 1995).
175. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 2200(a) (1994).
176. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 2200(a)(1). The current fee
schedule reads as follows:
Fill: One acre or less, flat fee of $1000. More than one
acre, $1000 per acre or part thereof (not to exceed
statutory maximum).
Dredge: Less than 10,000 cubic yards, flat fee of $500.
10,000 to 20,000 cubic yards, flat fee of $2000. More
than 20,000 cubic yards, $2000 plus $250 for each
additional 5000 cubic yards or part thereof (not to
exceed statutory maximum).
The "statutory maximum" is specified in the "threat-complexity"
fee schedule as $10,000. Id. § 2200(a)(1). It is interesting to note
that having a maximum, or ceiling, Imposed on the amount of
fees that can be paid could be quite favorable as a °bulk discount"
to large-scale dredging operations such as those the Federal
Government undertakes.
177. CAL. WATER CODE § 13260(1), (k).
178. Id.
179. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 2200(b).
180. CAL. WATER CODE § 13260(k).
181. CAL. WATER CODE § 13396.5 (West Supp, 1995).
182. Id. § 13396.5(b).
183. CAL. WATER CODE § 13396.5(d).
184. Id. § 13390 (West 1994).
185. Id. § 13396.5(b).
186. SWRCB brochure, THE BAY PROTECTION AND Toxic CLEANUP
PROGRAMI:l ANNUAL FEES (alteration In original) (original on file
with author).
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Remitted fees are deposited into the Bay Protection
and Toxic Cleanup Fund. 87 Just as dredge/fill oper-
ations are considered under a separate WDR fee
scale, dredging operations conducted within the
scope of the BPTCP are subject to a particularized
fee-payment system.is1
Like the WDR fee structure, two exemptions
from the payment of BPTCP fees exist. First, section
13396.5(g) exempts "any agricultural nonpoint
source discharger" from all BPTCP fees. 89 Second,
the regulations controlling the BPTCP state that
"ldlischarges from public and private educational
institutions resulting from the use of seawater to
maintain marine organisms for educational and
research purposes that are rated Ill-c ion the threat-
complexity scalel, shall be subject to an annual fee
of $0."190
IX. Analysis of California Fees Under City of
Columbia
Applying the City of Columbia reasonableness
test indicates that the flat fee scales under both the
WRD and BPTCP programs are reasonable and con-
stitutional, given the scope of the waivers of sover-
eign immunity previously discussed. The surround-
ing facts and circumstances indicate that the
charges subsidize services received by feepayers to
the extent possible given the economic realities in
California. The flat fees are calibrated so as to peak
at a predetermined statutory maximum, so that
large-scale dredge/fill projects under the auspices
of either WVDR or BPTCP may reap a "bulk dis-
count."9 1 Under these fee caps, large volume dis-
chargers are subject to a lesser fee-per-unit-of vol-
ume than are smaller projects. Since federal dredg-
ing projects are apt to be larger than private sector
projects, the flat fee system is actually fiscally
advantageous to federal instrumentalities.
Furthermore. the few statutory exceptions writ-
ten into the WDR and BPTCP fee systems 9 2 are
examples of the valid exercise of state police power.
For purposes of the rational basis test,t93 distinct
classification and subsequent exemption of animal
feedlot operators, farmers, and oil well operators is
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose,
namely, the encouragement of a healthy state econ-
omy.
California's economy would crumble if the
Legislature was unable to accommodate the special
needs of vital state industries in its regulatory pro-
grams. Regulation is a fundamental instrumentality
for achieving the greatest good for the greatest
number of people. Public benefit does not auto-
matically indicate the presence of a tax. however.194
When fee payment accompanies regulation, the fee
payer receives a direct benefit as well. In the context
of VDR and BPTCP fees. the fee payer receives
inspection, monitoring, and licensing services, as
well as the assurance that environmental contin-
gency plans are capable of being activated in
response to emergency situations1 95 However, the
fee payer is paying primarily for the privilege of dis-
charging waste into the state's waters.
The general public also benefits from these fee
payments. The more money taken in from fees, the
less that state taxpayers will have to contribute to
state-funded environmental protection. In the
process, the services provided by the SWRCB help
to protect the aquatic resources of the State that
every California citizen has an interest in protect-
ing.198 Similarly. all Californians have an interest in
encouraging the high quality of life fueled by a suc-
cessful economy. By determining, for example, that
187. CAL WATER CODE § 13396.5(c).
188. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23. § 2236(c)(6). Subsection (c)(6)
states:
(6) Each dredging operation in waters described In
Subsection (a) for which a Water Quality certification (13
U.S.C. Section 1341) has been issued by the State Water
Resources Control Board shall be subject to a fee based
on the cubic yards of dredge matenal authorized In the






Less than 30.000 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0
30.000-99.999 $ 1.500 $ 1.000 $ 0
100.000-299.999 $ 4.500 S 3.000 $1.000
300.000 & more $15.000 SI0.000 S3.000
If the dredging quantity stated in the Water Quality Certification
is less than the amount of the Section 404 (33 U.S.C. 1344) per-
mit, and the permitted volume is greater than 300.000 cubic
mit, and the permitted volume Is greater than 300,000 cubic
yards, the fee shall be based on the total permitted volume.
189. CAL VAER Cons § 13396.5(g).
190. CAL CoDE R€ss. tit. 23. § 2236(b)(2).
191. Id. at §§ 2200(a](l), 2236(cl(6).
192. St supra notes 177. 178, 190 and accompanying text.
193. Sa supra note 146 and accompanying text.
194. Sitsupra note 102 and accompanying text.
195. Sri. e.g.. Maine v. United States Navy. 973 F.2d at 1013
(JAI state spill response team., bears a dose enough relation
to the regulatory process as to permit a state's assessing regulat-
ed entities that may cause spills a special charge for its sup-
port.).
196. In addition, the quality of the States waters is closely
Intertwined with public health and safety. As the Supreme Court
noted. -there Is a presumption that state or local regulation of
matters related to health and safety is not Invalidated under the
Supremacy Clause- Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical
Labs. 471 U.S. 707. 715 (1985).
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exempting dairies from WDR fees would aid the
State economy to such an extent that it would out-
weigh any resulting damage to the environment, the
State Legislature is also making a decision reason-
ably grounded in the best interests of the public. 97
Therefore, the decisions to charge fees and to
exempt certain distinct classes of potential fee pay-
ers, are reasonable acts of the California Legislature
in accord with its police powers.
It is necessary and appropriate for the SWRCB
to place greater emphasis on fee-generated revenue
than upon general tax revenues. Current public pol-
icy favors the "polluter pays" concept, under which
individual dischargers remain financially account-
able for harm caused by discharges into state
waters. In addition, the fees received through the
WDR and BPTCP programs make up a very small
portion of the annual SWRCB budget. In fiscal year
1993-94, the SWRCB budget was $ 3 6 9 ,5 2 7 ,0 00.i98
Only 2.74% of that figure represents WDR fees, while
BPTCP fees compose a mere 0.73%.i99 Thus, the
SWRCB is not supporting any significant portion of
its general operation with revenues collected from
the two fee programs under discussion.
Analysis of "all the facts and circumstances"
surrounding WDR and BPTCP fees in light of the
"economic realities" involved in state legislative
decision-making indicate that such fees are not to
be characterized as impermissible taxes. The state
regulatory purposes underlying the imposition of
volume-based fees are influenced by the balance of
fiscal and environmental considerations, and spe-
cific, identifiable services are performed by the
SWRCB in exchange for payment of fees.
Finally, California itself recently enacted a
statute designed to ensure the reasonableness of
State regulatory fees. 200 The statute is included
under the heading "Regulation of Environmental
Protection" in the Health and Safety Code, and is
specifically entitled "Fee accountability programs;
review of fees assessed; fee increases."2 1 Within the
state government, section 57001 is more commonly
known as "S.B. 1082." Subsection (a) of the provi-
sion states that:
197. A lawsuit challenging state economic decisions faces
an uphill battle, since federal courts are extremely hesitant to tin-
ker with -matters involving a states fiscal affairs." Dawson v.
Childs, 665 F.2d 705, 709 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding no iurisdiction
over state defendants in an action concerning certain property
taxes).
198. Governor's Budget for Fiscal Year 1995-96.
199. Id.
200. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 57001(a) (West Supp.
Um 3,N Ni I
IThel fee accountability program shall be
designed to encourage more efficient and
cost-effective operation of the programs
from which fees are assessed, and shall be
designed to ensure that the amount of
each fee is not more than is reasonably
necessary to fund the efficient operation of
the activities or program for which the fee
is assessed. 202
Expressly included in the fees covered by section
57001 are the "fees assessed pursuant to subdivi-
sion (c) of Section 13260 of the Water Code for
waste discharge requirements."203
Naturally, it is debatable whether an internal
mandate concerning the reasonableness of a fee Is,
by itself, evidence of a given fee's reasonableness.
As discussed, the labeling of a fee as reasonable
does not necessarily make it So.204 Similarly, a state
statute requiring that fees meet efficient and rea-
sonable cost-to-benefit ratios is not necessarily dis-
positive proof that certain state fees subject to such
restrictions satisfy the requisite parameters. A
California regulatory agency could potentially
charge unreasonable fees in violation of both sec-
tion 57001 and precepts of federal sovereign immu-
nity from unconsented-to state regulation.
However, if a regulatory fee has not been found to
be in violation of section 57001, a court could still
consider the fact that the fee satisfies state stan-
dards of fee accountability and reasonableness in
deciding whether the fee is appropriate.
X. Conclusion
The state regulations mandating payment of
WDR and BPTCP fees are utilitarian balancing acts
that maximize return for all involved, including the
fee payer. The regulations are not blind directives to
subsidize general government operations. To allow
the federal government to hide behind illogical
interpretations of "reasonableness" for sovereign
immunity purposes cuts at the heart of the states'
federalist prerogative to exercise considered, ratio-
nal control over their internal affairs. A
Massachusetts-type test, with its rigid requirements,
1994). Added by 1993 Cal. Stat. 418 (S.B. 1082), § 5
201. id.
202. CAL. HEALTH & SAFEY CODE § 57001(a).
203. Id. § 57001(d)(8). The reference to "subdivision (c) of
Section 13260' by the Legislature is probably a drafting error,
since (c) makes no mention of fees. The fee provision of section
13260 is subdivision (d).
204. See supra note 86.
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is inapposite, and not designed for, a state-charge-
on-federal-entity situation given the broad nature
of the Supremacy Clause. Furthermore, because the
Federal Government can waive its immunity to any
degree of state regulation or taxation, waiver of
immunity to "reasonable [state] service charges"
implies a determination of reasonableness that
accords with traditional notions of acceptable state
regulations and power. To find otherwise would
transmute the waiver of reasonable service charges
into a waiver of those service charges which the fed-
eral government agrees are reasonable, pursuant
not to the traditional constitutional standards gov-
erning state regulation, but to a set of rigid extra-
constitutional criteria.

